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The complexity of modern aircraft and the vast advances in
technology resulting from the technological explosion in weapons
delivery systems create a major problem for the professional naval
aviator. In an effort to solve this problem in the limited field
of the Attack Carrier Striking Force naval aviator, the career pat-
tern trends in industrial and educational fields have been analyzed.
The present career pattern of the Attack Carrier Striking Force naval
aviator has been analyzed and it has been weighed against the combat
readiness status desired of these naval aviators. A comparison of a
World War II, fighter aircraft, a post Korea fighter aircraft, and a
modern day fighter aircraft, and a discussion of present day high
speed flight problems reveal the extent of technological advances in
this field. The educational and training requirements for profession-
alism in this field are discussed. Finally a program is outlined that
would aid in attaining the professionalism required in this field for
the maximum combat readiness that is desired.
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CHAPTER I
THE PROFESSIONAL AND SPECIALIZATION; A NAVY PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
In this era of "Cold War" and "Brink of War" tactics in inter-
national relations the United States must maintain its military
forces in a constant state of maximum combat readiness. Any relaxa-
tion from this maximum readiness status is an open invitation for
Premier Krushchev to proceed with his avowed intentions to "bury" us!
One of the prime components of our military forces is the Naval
Striking Force. The mobility and versatile power of the Striking
Force make it an ideal instrument for enforcing national military
policy. Even in peace time, unsettled world conditions require atten-
tion. The existence of a striking force can serve as a stabilizing
influence to prevent the outbreak of hostilities. If hostilities
should occur in spite of diplomacy and other means of settling inter-
national disputes, the striking force is available at once for the
prompt and decisive action which may be necessary. Mobility - the
greatest asset of a striking force - permits surprise attacks at any
point on the periphery of an enemy land area bounded by navigable waters
and forces the enemy to spread his forces on the defensive, thus deny-
ing him the initiative.
Technological improvements have multiplied the power and extended
the range of the attack carrier striking force, first developed by the
Navy in the early 1920' s and brought to a high stage of perfection as
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the Fast Carrier Task Force during World War II. Essentially the
Attack Carrier Striking Force, supported by an underway replenish-
ment group, constitutes a mobile air base which can be moved within
effective striking range of many appropriate enemy targets. Its
offensive and supporting capabilities have reached an exceptionally
high degree of effectiveness.
Carrier based aircraft are the principal weapons of an attack
carrier striking force. These aircraft are of three major types;
light attack, heavy attack and fighters. For the most part these
aircraft are, or will be, high performance jets. Their primary mis-
sion is offensive air action - strikes against designated objectives
in order to establish and maintain local air superiority; neutralize
enemy bases; interdict enemy transportation and communications; and
give tactical air support to amphibious and surface-action operations.
Secondary missions for carrier based aircraft are air defense, AEW,
ASW, photo and weather reconaissance, search and rescue, and electronic
countermeasures.
The men who man these aircraft determine, for the most part, how
effective our Attack Carrier Striking Force will be. No matter how
capable the aircraft is, its effectiveness as a weapons system is
determined by how well the man controlling it utilizes it. It is the
aim of this paper to investigate the relationship between the career
patterns of these men and their combat readiness and to recommend
possible improvements to career pattern programs so that the combat
readiness of naval aviators manning Striking Force aircraft may be
maintained at the highest possible level.
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THE NEED FOR PROFESSIONALISM
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George Anderson in a recent
article made the following remarks, "First, I desire that each man
know his job and do his duty. And I don't mean by this that a man
know 95 per cent of his job and perform his duties 95 per cent of the
time. That isn't enough today." He went on to say, later in the arti-
cle, "I want all our men to use their inherent mental capabilities to
the utmost and to do everything possible to improve their minds.
There was a day when the effectiveness of a man-of-war depended to
a great extent on the strength of a man's back - but today, physical
strength has given way to mental strength. The Navy needs bright -
alert - intelligent men who are mentally equipped to meet the compli-
cated demands of the future"
The watchword of Naval Aviation is professionalism. Webster de-
fines a profession as "a vocation or occupation requiring advanced
training in some liberal art or science, and usually involving mental
rather than manual work"; his definition of a professional is, "One
having much experience and great skill in a specified role."

PROFESSIONALISM AND SPECIALIZATION
"Professionalism" is also becoming a watchword in education
and industry. Specialization and sub-specialization is blooming on
all sides. The medical profession is an excellent example of the
trend to and demand for specialization. We find the general practi-
tioner increasingly harder to find, since he is being replaced by
the specialist. These specialists are popularly grouped in a medical
clinic and often a person who is ill will be referred to three or four
or more doctors before the illness is finally diagnosed. This special-
ization has served mankind well since it allows a field that can proper-
ly be mastered by one man. The educational field has wisely required a
broad general medical education as a base for the specialized fields.
In the education field what was formerly a major field in the
sciences has been greatly subdivided. No longer does a student major
in what has become a broad field of chemistry, physics, or biology.
Scientific progress and the technological explosion of the last twenty
years has required the birth of new fields such as nuclear physics and
bio-chemistry. Even the honored field of mathematics is spawning sub
areas. The U. S. Naval Postgraduate School has this year established
a new department of Operations Analysis. Many of the large industries
support educational institutions; several of the giant corporations
have even established universities of their own. General Motors is
one of these firms and a glance at the curricula of the General Motors
Institute of Technology will indicate the trend to the necessary sub-
specialization that is required to support present day industrial life.
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New professions are emerging as a result of this trend to special-
ization. Management consultants are prominent in any industrial area.
Organization and administration specialists are employed by many large
corporations. Statisticians and operations analysts are filling an
important need in many areas. The traditional salesman now appears in
different sub areas such as the sales engineer, market analyst and
promotion specialist. One of our major present day problems is what to
do with the general laborer, a non-specialist who is fast becoming "un-
employable."
The fact that the economy and industry support this sub-special-
ization is proof that it is necessary. The profit motive will not long
endure any unnecessary frills. The breadth and depth of the phenominal
scientific and technological advances require that fields be narrowed
so that man can master a particular field. Even the social sciences,
always slow in adapting, are beginning to sub-specialize in areas such
as industrial psychology and behavioral psychology.
In recent years there has been much concern about language barriers
between the sub areas. We have all heard the technical specialist on a
quiz program talk in his trade jargon. To the uninitiated it is un-
intelligible gibberish. With the advent of computers this problem is
becoming even more critical since the computer can be a great aid in
nearly any field. The communications problem here is compounded by the
fact that not only two different areas must have a compatible language
but that language must also be compatible to the computer. A great deal
of work is being done in this language area. The latest efforts are in
-5-

attempting to quantify all areas as much as possible. Note here that
there is no tendency to compound many sub areas into one but the ef-
fort is to develop suitable communications between the fields.
SPECIALIST TO GENERALIST
Now let us consider, for a moment, the executive class in our
business life. The corporate executives stem from all walks of life,
but one thing nearly all have in common; they were at one time
specialists, either engineers, sales specialists, lawyers or adminis-
tration experts. Congress is a good example of this trend. The
business of Congress is making laws and better than three fourths of
our Congressmen were and are lawyers. The statement then, that the
majority of the executive class are generalists that emerged from a
specialist area, appears to be valid.
The Navy's enlisted structure follows the specialist to general-
ist path with excellent results. After a "boot camp" indoctrination
the enlisted man selects and strikes for a rate in a particular sub
area. He remains in this narrow sub area, mastering it as he progress-
es upward. At the first class and chief petty officer level he then
is required to broaden his knowledge to encompass the whole of the
parent area and the administration functions that such a broadening
requires,
THE PRESENT NAVAL AVIATOR CAREER PATTERN
With the foregoing comments in mind let us consider the career
pattern of a typical striking force naval aviator during his first
fifteen years which would bring him to commander selection point. His
first tour will be with an operating squadron. He will arrive with
-6-

three to four hundred hours of flight time and within six months to
a year will be qualified to carry out most operational missions. The
reticence of all weather type squadron commanding officers in desir-
ing only the outstanding flight training graduates indicates the
difficulties which often attend this stage of a flying career. In
fact the command decision rendered in manning the recently formed F4H
squadrons was that all reporting naval aviators were to be "second tour*
pilots who had successfully completed this original fleet tour.
The next three year tour will be spent in either the Training
Command, the General Line and Naval Science School or assigned to avia-
tion activities of the Shore Establishment. To be more specific:
"747. of the officers rotated ashore will be assigned to the Train-
ing Command, General Line School, and Colleges, either as in-
structors or students. The remaining 267o will be assigned to
aviation activities of the Shore Establishment. The majority
of billets in the training command are operational flying assign-
ments thereby providing maximum opportunity for an aviator to
enhance his operational skill."
I take exception to the statement that the majority of the train-
ing command assignments provide maximum opportunity for an aviator to
enhance his operational skill. I would qualify this statement by say-
ing that only in the Advanced Training Command type flying billets
can the striking force naval aviator maintain anything close to a
"combat ready" status, and these billets are definitely a small minority
of the training command billets. I personally served in a Basic Train-
ing Unit where the training load was so heavy that even the annual
United States Bureau of Naval Personnel, Officer Fact Book
,
(NavPers 15898) page 8-28. (See Appendix A).
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instrument requirements for the instructor pilots were waived. Assign-
ment to a school automatically brands a naval aviator as a "proficiency
pilot" and limits him to from 90-100 flight hours per year. In this
status only a bare instrument qualification can be maintained.
The remaining 26% assigned to aviation activities of the Shore
Establishment are too varied to consider in detail. I am safe in
stating, however, that only in rare instances can a Striking Force
naval aviator maintain a "combat ready" status while attached to
these billets.
With the scarcity of squadron billets the next four year tour has
become a split tour with two years spent in an operating squadron and
two years in a ship, staff, and/or overseas billet. The two year
squadron tour commences with a six month Replacement Air Group retrain-
ing cycle during which the aviator is given intensive training to re-
turn him to fleet standards. A few months after reporting to the
operating squadron the reporting aviator is again "combat ready."
The two years of duty in a ship, staff, and/or overseas billet is
again a minimum proficiency type flying period either because of duties
or funds or both.
The next shore tour is the Advanced Educational Phase:
During this tour approximately 377. of the officers will be assign-
ed to the Training Command. The remaining 637. will be assigned
to various other air shore activities such as the Navy Department,
Naval Air Stations, etc. Certain officers will have an opportun-
ity to attend one of the service colleges. Schooling and other
postgraduate training will continue to be available. Those officers
who have previously attended school will be ordered to duty allied




Here again it is most probable that a naval aviator will be
assigned to a "proficiency billet" with the ensuing erosion of his
very costly abilities. Cost wise, even the required facilities for
proficiency flying are becoming increasingly prohibitive in money
and manpower costs.
The Advanced Operational and Command Development Phase cannot
be spelled out in detail. However, the Career Chart of the Officer
Fact Book (See Appendix A) indicates that one half of this period
will be spent in an operational billet.
From this outline of a typical Striking Force naval aviator
career pattern, the following fact is obvious; a naval aviator is in
an operational flying billet a maximum of seven and one-half years
out of the first fifteen years of his career. Recently the shortage
of flying billets has reduced normal operational flying tours to from
five to six years total out of fifteen years.
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The question this paper will attempt to answer is, "Is the
present naval aviator career pattern in consonance with the maximum
state of combat readiness required for naval aviators manning Attack
Carrier Striking Force Aircraft? And, if it isn't, to suggest some
possible improvements to these career patterns." In other words,
"does the 'we 11 -rounded' naval officer concept remain compatible with





THE PRESENT STATE OF THE ART AND PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH SUPERSONIC
AIRCRAFT
MANNED AIRCRAFT OR PILOTLESS MISSILES
Before proceeding further let us take a look at future require-
ments for manned aircraft. To dispel a popular idea that missiles
are making manned aircraft obsolete consider the following statements:
"Thus we come to the factor of human judgment. I have been dis-
cussing this with my friend, Major Alexander J, De Seversky, one of
our foremost aeronautical experts.
Sasha emphasized that robot missiles have 'no power of choice' and
he went on to make a provocative point, which he also expressed in his
latest book, "'America - Too Young to Die.'"
It is inevitable that one side or the other, or both, will develop
anti-missile defenses. In that case it is quite probable that a super-
sonic manned airplane - with its cargo of human brains and human judg-
ment as well as weapons - could become the ONLY weapon capable of pene-
trating complex defense systems. By military paradox, it would super-
sede in importance the non-thinking, fixed trajectory ballistic missile."
George Carroll, aviation editor of Hearst Headline Service, has
come up with a couple of other pertinent quotes:
One was by Sir Roy Dobson, managing director of the Hawker Sid-
deley group of British planemakers, to Royal Air Force cadets:
"In an age of complex, electronic weaponry, nothing yet can re-
place human judgment. No electronic device can equal the human brain,
capable of thinking for itself and interpreting changes of situation
instead of merely conforming to preconceived pattern."
The other is by Scott Crossfield, North American test pilot and
ONE OF THE FLIERS WHO SAVED OUR 4,000 MPH X-15 RESEARCH PLANE FROM FAIfc-
ING ON 24 OF ITS 48 MISSIONS. Speaking of a human being at the controls
of a plane or spacecraft, he asked:
"Where else would you get a non- linear computer weighing only 160
pounds, having a billion biniary decison elements, that can be mass
produced by unskilled labor?"
3With that witty and searching question, I rest my case.
•Editorial in the San Francisco Examiner , March 18, 1962.
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From these statements by eminent aeronautical authorities we can
deduct that the manned aircraft is not in danger of becoming obsolete.
It is also obvious that the aircraft of the future, to accomplish the
strike mission, will probably be larger, capable of attaining extreme-
ly high altitudes, and will be equipped with ultra-sophisticated systems
such as electronic counter-countermeasure devices. Even the present
low altitude run in under the radar envelope will be eliminated with
the advent of space satelite radar observation platforms. This trend
is supported by present aircraft model trends. One piece of ground
support equipment for the F4H (Phantom II), is nearly as large and is
more intricate than World War II fighters!
A COMPARISON OF THE F6F-5 WITH THE F11F-1 AND THE F4H-1
Now let us consider some of the present Navy strike aircraft. As
a starting point I include excerpts from an excellent study done by the
OPNAV/BUPERS Personnel Monitoring Group in 1958. Bear in mind that the
F-ll-F has now been relegated to the Advanced Training Command and is
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NOTE: For further examples of F4H technical complexity see a
sampling of F4H pilot kneedboard flip cards in Appendix
B.
The F8U and the A3D both lie somewhere between the F-ll-F and
the F4H in technical complexity. The A4D is unique in that it is one
of the few existing operational aircraft that have resisted to a certain
degree the trend toward ultra sophistication.
To approach this same area from a slightly different tack - the cost
of the F3F of pre-World War II was $50,000 whereas the latest fighter in
our stable, the F4H, comes off the production line with a cool two million
dollar price tag! The speed of the F3F was 300 knots, straight down;
the F4H Mach Two plus. The operating altitude, max, of the F3F was
18,000 feet, while the F4H operates straight and level above 60,000 feet
and has accomplished just under 100,000 feet. Mission time for the
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F3F was about seven hours; normal cycle time for the F4H is about
three hours. But perhaps the most important and pertinent fact to us
is, that in a given inflight emergency, the ratio of emergency knowledge
required by the pilot of these two aircraft is on the order of 1:20.
The pilot of today's aircraft must know twenty times as much about an
infinitely more complex machine.
TRANSONIC AND SUPERSONIC PROBLEMS
Modern jets are plagued with problems due to their transonic and
supersonic capabilities. Present jets are designed essentially for
high performance at high altitudes , with a relatively high ratio of
thrust, especially with use of afterburner. This power available can
push the airplane past its designed speeds, and at low altitude, when
the airframe design limits are exceeded, it is then in the 'unglue"
area. Recently an F4H in a high speed low altitude run completely
disintegrated in a little over two seconds.
One characteristic helps warn the pilot of nearing that danger
area: the effectiveness and sensitivity of the control system in-
creases as the altitude decreases and speed increases—because lift
is directly proportional to the density of the air.
Add to this near— limit speed/altitude situation the fact that
the power controls are designed for sonic and supersonic speed con-
trol, and provide the pilot with large control in deflection with
small physical effort. Result: The control surfaces are easy to move
and hence it becomes easier to exceed the G- limit of the airframe.
Further, in many artifical "feel" systems, the "breakout forces"
are often higher than the force required for further control, which
15-

makes for a tendency to overcontrol, especially by the new pilot.
Such a combination is largely responsible for the PIO, Pilot
Induced Oscillation, where, if the aircraft is at or near the limit
of the flight envelope, a gust or turbulence can precipitate the 'UC"
maneuver.
Results of such encounters may cause immediate damage or possibly
incipient damage which may not be noticed, but which may pay off in
trouble later. Hence the necessity for the pilot to know the low alti-
tude flight envelope and the penalties for exceeding limits.
AEROELASTICITY PROBLEMS
Penalties result from the aerodynamic effects of high speed;
either a pure mach effect or from high Indicated Air Speed:
Aeroelasticity occurs because the aircraft is not a per-
fectly rigid body but bends and deforms under aerodynamic loadings.
Early aircraft development to overcome this often consisted of a
"try and see" process to establish structural limits. Some of the
more prominent effects of Aeroelasticity are:
Fulselage bending occurs because of the increase in loading on
lift surfaces at high speeds. As lift increases on the wings with
speed, higher lift is demanded of the horizontal stabilizer to main-
tain level flight. Thus, at high speeds, if the fuselage permits,
the fuselage will bend upwards due to the large "up" forces at each
end. This causes an increase in the effective angle of attack of the
wing and a reduction in the L/A of the horizontal stabilizer, which
causes more forward stick to be required. This is less common on jet
aircraft because of the relatively short fuselage which is further
-16-

strengthened by the engine installation, but conventional aircraft
still favor a long fuselage and bending can often be present at high
speeds.
Wing divergence is caused by abnormally high stress on the wing,
and simply stated, means that the wings might snap off at high speeds
because the aircraft was on the wrong side of the redline. This
trouble is more common to straight wing a/c Factors involved are:
wing torsional stiffness (twist resistance) and the distance between
the center of twist and the aerodynamic center. A typical situation
would be that of a high IAS, encountering a slight updraft from tur-
bulence, which gives a slight uplift to the wing--to commence a lethal-
ly vicious cycle: (often occurring so rapidly as to appear a one-shot
affair). The slight uplift produces a momentary increase in Lift;
this causes the wing to deflect upward (twist); the L/A is further in-
creased, which produces more deflection, more L/A and so on, with the
process repeating instantaneously until wing failure and complete
"divergence." At speeds below critical values this process of incre-
ments of lift becomes smaller until a condition of stable equilibrium
is reached—which process the airplane will follow if the pilot has not
pushed it into the redline speed zone.
The classic, and surprising example of the aileron reversal pheno-
menon! is: In the redline zone, the pilot wishes to roll the airplane
to the left; he applies left aileron--and the airplane bends around to
the right! This is another function of the stiffness of the wing.
Normally, at reasonable speeds, Lift on the "down" aileron wing increases
17-
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lift on the "up" aileron wing decreases, and the desired roll moment is
produced. At high speeds, however, the down aileron is subjected to
high forces from the forward motion of the airplane, with a total force
causing a twisting of the wing to twist the leading edge down and re-
duce the angle of attack. The "up" aileron produces a moment to in-
crease the L/A on the opposite wing to reduce the desired rolling
2
moment. Now the twisting moment varies as V , whereas the restoring
torque remains constant with speed, so it is possible that as speed in-
creases the rolling moment becomes less until a speed is reached when
aileron deflection will not produce a rolling moment and beyond this
speed the effect of the aileron becomes reversed. In a sense the de-
flected aileron becomes a "tab" which in turn deflects the wing as a
"aileron" to decrease the desired roll performance. For example, in
the F8U, at near sealevel, definite aileron reversal can occur above
650 knots. Thus the max speed restriction on the Crusader below
20,000' is based on aeroelasticity effects, with even more stringent
restrictions imposed below 10,000'.
Note: Until the advent of high performance aircraft, particularly
sweptwings, designers avoided this trouble by beefing up the wings--
but if you build the a/c like an anvil, it will fly like an anvil..
So, alternate ways were devised to produce a rolling moment, such as
inboard ailerons, flaperons, spoilers and the like, all of which have
their limitations also.
Destructive flutter has perhaps the most far reaching effect of
aerodynamic phenomena on the design of high speed a/c. Flutter, or
18-

"buzz" can occur on any of the aerodynamic surfaces, wing, fuselage
or tail surfaces, but it can start on all of the control surfaces
simultaneously. The trouble results from a high frequency oscilla-
tion of surfaces excited by the airstream at high speed. Flutter can
be responsible for the loss of control surfaces, sections of paneling,
and in some cases, large sections of tail assembly. In the past flutter
was readily detectable by the pilot as he was connected directly with
the control surfaces by wires, etc. Now he has no direct physical
contact and hence is not as aware as before. Wing planforms and aspect
ratios have significant effects on flutter characteristics. A decrease
in wing aspect ratio and an increase in sweep tend to raise the flutter
speed.
Due to the demands placed upon us by the progress of our potential
enemies, the evolution of more advanced combat aircraft is a continuous
process for which no end can be predicted as long as the enemy competi-
tion continues. As an example of the complexity that can be expected,
it has been estimated, in general terms, that the complexity of elec-
tronic functions and equipment in combat aircraft increases as the
square of the speed in the region above Mach 1.
Combat aircraft capable of operating at Mach 3 and in excess of




EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
EDUCATION REQUIREMENTS
In addition to the basic Bachelor of Arts courses desirable in
present educational curricula, at least a working knowledge of the
following courses are a requirement for the strike aircraft naval
aviator if he is to utilize his aircraft to the utmost of its capa-
bilities. These courses will be arranged by aircraft major component
systems and some duplication will therefore occur.
Airframes
Physics (including Mechanics, Stress Analysis & Nuclear Physics)
Aerodynamics
Hydraulics
Chemistry (including Metallurgy and Plastics)






Chemistry (oriented in fuels and lubricants & Metallurgy)
Mathematics
Airborne Systems
Electronics (including radar, CM, ECCM and Navigational systems)
Chemistry (oriented in propellants, explosive warheads and
nuclear devices)




Electronics (oriented around radar, communication and navigational
systems)
Note: In a recent Naval Postgraduate School lecture an Electronics
Professor stated that to keep abreast of the developments in
the electronics field today, a person would have to spend 30




Although the strike aircraft naval aviator need not be master
of all the above listed areas he certainly must have a good working
knowledge of them that will enable him to comprehend pertinent develop-
ments as they apply to him. These areas are, of course, in addition
to the normal knowledge and skill areas required of the naval aviator!
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS
In recognition of the need for specialization and economy the
Naval Air Training Command has split its thru-put into various pipe-
lines (single-engine, multi-engine, VA, VF, VP and ASW). The ex-
cellence of the pre-designation training of a naval aviator requires no
testimonial. After the Training Command training, requirements fall
into three major categories:
Familiarization
The naval aviator must not only initially become familiar with the
systems peculiar to the model aircraft which he is flying but, if he is
to remain a "professional", he must be continually reviewing these
systems.
Instruments
Above and beyond normal VFR day, night, and carrier operations,
the acquisition and maintenance of the highest level of instrument
flight proficiency requires a considerable amount of a naval aviator's
efforts, A minimum of 10 hours, either actual or realistically simu-
lated, instrument flight time per month is highly desirable.
Weapons Delivery
The "pay-off" training requirement is, of course, weapons delivery.
-21-

Up to 50 percent of normal operational flight time will be spent in
this training.
To be proficient and "Combat Ready" in these three areas a strike
pilot should fly 50 hours per month. (50 hours desired, 30 hours mini-
mum). A typical F4H 2-1/2 hour flight should require the following:
2 hours flight planning, 2 hours briefing and debriefing, up to 1 hour
suiting-up (pressure suit), manning, and deplanning. Thus the strike
pilot would be occupied 150 hours per month in flight and flight re-
lated activities. Add to this a nominal 1 hour per day ground train-
ing and 1 hour for collateral duties and we find that this totals out
to 200 hours per month. In a 25 work day month the pilot would thus
be occupied 8 hours per day I These then are the training requirements
of a "professional" strike naval aviator to remain "combat ready!"
To re-emphasize these requirements consider the following comments:
"A complete knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of his
aircraft is mandatory for every pilot. We are flying planes today that
can exceed their maximum allowable airspeed in straight and level flight,
What happens then—direct ional control is lost; try a roll and inertia
coupling sets in and they just don't build them to fly sideways.
Or take the case of the nugget who takes off in afterburner and
accelerates so rapidly that he is in a high "q" region (going like a
bat at low altitude). If it is a slightly turbulent day the setting is
right for a PIO (pilot induced oscillation), JC maneuver or what have
you. It happened, and not knowing how to recover our boy ejected.
Down the drain goes $7,000,000 worth of brand new airplane--not be-
cause of any material malfunction or failure but because the pilot
was not familiar with the aerodynamic characteristics of his airplane.
If we pursue this line of reasoning to combat tactics we find
that the pilot will not obtain maximum combat effectiveness from his
airplane because he does not fully understand its capabilities and
limitations, Any future combat will undoubtedly require that we get
maximum performance from our pilots and aircraft.
The need for having personnel in the fleet who have a background
-22-

in aeronautical engineering is becoming every more apparent. Techni-
cal advances in aircraft and equipment are progressing rapidly. We
sat with guns at Mach .8-. 9 for a long time. Now we are on the thres-
hold of Mach 2 plus weapons systems.
We cannot afford to stumble along as stick and throttle jockeys.
With a decrease in squadrons and air groups and the spiralling cost of
aircraft we must maintain every organization in a state of top combat
readiness. This can be done only if every pilot is a well trained
professional aviator.^"
THE PATH TO PROFESSIONALISM
How then does a pilot become a well trained professional aviator?
The first step, of course, is fulfilling the educational requirements
previously described in this chapter. The second step is completing
the Naval Air Training Command Syllabus. The final step in attaining
professional status is accomplished in the initial operational tour.
If this professional status is to be maintained it will require con-
stant retraining and review. New weapons, techniques, and develop-
ments must be mastered and applied as they appear. Modern Carrier
Naval Aviation cannot brook widely spaced, sporadic aviator career
patterns. It demands constant application if the striking force
naval aviator is to remain "professional" and our Naval Striking Forces
can afford nothing less than a "professional!"
4
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From the facts and discussion set forth in Chapters II and III
it is felt that the present career pattern for strike aircraft naval
aviators is not in consonance with the high standards of "combat readi-
ness" and "professionalism" that must be maintained. Although the pre-
sent Replacement Air Group training is an excellent means of retrain-
ing the strike naval aviator before reporting to the operating squadron
it is not enough. This type of flying has become a vocation rather than
an avocation! As such it requires the constant and continuing applica-
tion of all faculties of the Strike Naval Aviator rather than the present
sporadic exposure.
RECOMMENDATIONS
It is recommended that a program developed along the following
lines be adopted for strike naval aviators:
Source
Candidates should be selected from highly motivated high school
graduates or comparable sources.
Training
Academic training should be standardized in the areas noted in
Chapter III with sub-specialization in one of the four major aircraft
component fields. This training would be obtained at either an accredit-
ed civilian educational institution or at one of the present "in-service"




Service composition and length
Upon completion of flight training, which would include the pre-
sent Replacement Air Group training, the strike naval aviator would
report to a fleet squadron where he would be quickly integrated and
brought to maximum "combat readiness". Here he would remain for a
period of 10 to 12 years, maintaining at all times maximum "combat
readiness." If any rotation is desired during this period it could
be to the Replacement Air Group as an instructor or to an equivalent
billet. Maximum non-operational tours should be limited to from six
to ten months for advanced educational purposes as required. While
in an operating squadron he would be assigned, as much as possible,
to collateral duties in his sub-speciality area and when not so
assigned would be required to keep abreast of developments in that
area.
End service period procedure
At the end of the 10 or 12 year period the strike naval aviator
would indicate to the Bureau of Personnel his desire as to retention
or release. Upon review of the individual's record of performance
and recommendation from the squadron CO., BuPers would determine
whether to retain the individual officer or to release him. If re-
tained, the officer, now in a permanent career status, would be ordered
to such schools as deemed necessary to prepare him for command and
higher responsibilities. The Navy would of course have the option of
retaining those wishing to be released, if service requirements made
-25-

this necessary. To those officers being released the Navy would pay
a "lump sum" settlement, possibly $25,000; this payment would end
all obligations with the exception of a "National Emergency" obliga-
tion of the individual officer.
PROGRAM ADVANTAGES
The first advantage is of course in the source region. High cali-
ber high school graduates are more maleable and far better motivated
than more mature college trainees; and there are more of them! The
present trend in industry is to select promising young trainees and
give them the necessary education to fit the organization. The scientif-
ic education would be costly but would be a good investment in either
the case of retention or release. Those who have served as instructors
in Flight Training will readily support the higher motivation factor for
high school graduate level trainees.
Secondly the scientific education and sub-specialization would have
advantages in areas other than flying. Squadron training would be much
easier and more effective because of the homogeneous grouping (such
grouping doesn't exist now). No longer would a sharp enlisted man be
working for a division officer who knew little or nothing about his
technical specialty; thus morale and maintenance problems could be few-
er. If released, the individual officer could easily take a parallel
position in the civilian economy and be of benefit there. Those officers
retained would of course be specialists, but "specialist" is no longer
a dirty word in military circles. An excellent definition of the gen-
eral officer or flag rank officer, is a "specialist who is broad enough
and intelligent enough to encompass all related fields." These are the
-26-

officers that would be retained.
Another distinct advantage would be the certainty of the program.
No longer would the young officer be plagued by the question "Where am
I going next year?" A man cannot control his future but he is certain-
ly happier if he is secure in some knowledge of it! He wouldn't be wond-
ering if he were being ordered to sea duty, he'd know and would adapt
to this fact. The longer tour length would also allow some planning
and permanency.
The recruiting advantages of this type of program are outstanding.
The proposed "lump sum" settlement would be very attractive in this
materialistic age. It would allow the released officer adequate funds
to enter a field of his choice and with a considerable amount of finan-
cial independence. Realism requires recognition of the fact that the
type of officer that is desired would be earning, on the average, twice
as much money as his Navy pay in civilian industry. Also in civilian
industry he would have considerable more freedom than the rigors of
military discipline can allow. These points may seem insignificant
but it must be realized that we are in constant competition with civil-
ian industry for our officer complement. This fact is painfully appar-
ent as it becomes increasingly more difficult to retain outstanding
young naval aviators.
The "lump sum" settlement for the officer desiring release and the
retention selection for the officer desiring to stay would both provide
excellent motivational factors. The retention seeking officer would be
-27-

striving to assure his selection for retention. The release seeking
officer could not afford slipshod performance with its attendant
danger of early separation which would cause forfeiture of the "lump
sum" payment. This would avoid the present possibility of an officer
reaching retirement status purely by virtue of having done nothing
"wrong"! The release costs seem large at first but consider that
$25,000 is equal to under seven years of a Commander's retirement pay;
to say nothing of his active duty pay to retirement. These costs would
be offset to a great degree by the decreased requirements for "profici-
ency flying" hardware and facilities. These costs would also be known
fixed costs, not variables, and, as such, would be easier to consider
in fiscal planning.
The last and most important advantage would be the fact that the
"combat readiness" of our strike naval aviators would be maintained at
maximum level continuously. This is a requirement that we must meet!
This program is not new. The Hobb's report recommended a part of
it in 1959. The Army and Air Force have adopted similar programs for
specialists. The British Government has effected a similar program in
all military branches (see Appendix C).
With increased technical complexity the key-note of today's Navy,
we continue to insist that unrestricted Line Officers be required to
master every facet of their career and be thoroughly versatile in meet-
ing requirements of a tremendous range of technical, planning and opera-
tional billets. This practice was suited to the limited technical and
operational developments of navies of the past but must result in dilu-
tion of leadership in future navies where the exercise of strong leader-
-28-

ship and the maintenance of professional proficiency by officers
demand the reduction of the present span of cognition required of
them. As the requirement for depth of knowledge, experience and pro-
ficiency in a given field is intensified, the breadth of that field
must be narrowed to accommodate human limitations. He who loses the
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Aviation assignment patterns are designed to give the naval avia-
tor (code 13XX officers) necessary command qualifications for aircraft
units and those ships primarily associated with aviation units, as well
as to develop the naval aviator's technical capabilities for peace or
war. Professional development to accomplish the above is set forth in
Sections 831 through 836. Additional valuable information, pertaining
to the assignment and rotation patterns of code 13XX officers, is
periodically issued by the Officer Distribution Division of the Bureau
of Naval Personnel in the "Line Officer Personnel Newsletter." This in-
formation should be disseminated to all code 13XX officers within the
command.
FACTORS AFFECTING ASSIGNMENT PATTERNS, CODE 13XX OFFICERS
In addition to the general factors set forth in Section 804 the
following factors influence career patterns and duty assignments during
the active duty period:
a. Decentralized Detailing - In order to provide greater flexi-
bility in meeting fleet needs for other than squadron command and ship-
board billets, COMNAVAIRLANT, COMNAVAIRPAC, and CNATRA have delegated
authority to modify "for further assignment" (FFA) orders to indicate an
ultimate duty station for designated naval aviators through the grade of
lieutenant commander who are ordered to their respective commands. This
delegated authority does not extend to naval aviation observers, code 135X




b. Varied Shore Duty Assignments - Shore duty assignments provide
the naval aviator with a variety of experiences in the field of school-
ing, instructing, air developmental experimentation, and administration.
During shore duty assignments, an aviator has the opportunity to broaden
his experiences so that he can fill managerial and planning billets in
the Airshore Establishment in the latter phases of his career. Aviators
will normally be assigned a duty tour in the Training Command at least
once during their career.
c. Varied Sea Duty Assignments - Sea duty assignments give the
naval aviator ample opportunity to develop the operational background
necessary for eventual command assignments. Insofar as practicable,
an attempt is made to give officers tours of duty in both the Atlantic
and Pacific Fleets so that they will become familiar with the varied
operational requirements of each fleet and broaden their geographical
background. A code 1310 officer should expect at least two tours of
duty aboard ship as a ship's officer. Tours in Air Transport Squad-
rons (VR) are normally of 30 to 36 months duration and offer opportunity
to gain valuable all-weather, logistic, and airmanship experience.
d. Sea/Shore Rotation - In an effort to achieve greater stability
in the fleets and the Air Shore Establishment, officers of the grades
of Lieutenant Commander and below have been phased into a four year
sea duty tour and a three year shore duty tour. In the grades of Com-
mannder and senior, tour lengths are varied as necessary to round out
an individual's qualifications and to meet the needs of the service.
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e. Special Abilities - Special abilities can lead to the assign-
ment to staffs in the fields of special weapons, training, operations,
personnel, and so forth.
f. Special Qualification Assignments:
1. LTA. Officers dually qualified, LTA and HTA, will normal-
ly rotate between these duties. In some instances, the rotation might
occur on a single split sea tour.
2. Helicopter - Naval aviators qualified in helicopters
normally spend only one tour in this type of flying unless the officer
is subsequently placed in command of a helicopter squadron or specifical-
ly requests reassignment on his Officer Preference and Personal Informa-
tion Card.
g. Changes in Qualification - Those officers selected for jet
squadrons who are not jet qualified will be ordered via the appropriate
RAG squadrons to obtain the qualification. The eventual assignment to
an operational squadron is determined by the Force Commander and is made
on the basis of fleet requirements,
h. Command Tours - Squadron command assignments are normally made
for one training-development cycle. Ship commands are for 14-18 months.
i. Desires of the Individual - The desires of the individual, such
as requests for schools or extension of tours, are normally granted pro-
viding there is no conflict with fleet requirements. Desires should be
indicated on the Officer Preference and Personal Information Card.
j. Distribution of 1100 and 1300 Officers - Aviation officers
approximate non-aviation officers (unrestricted line) in overall numbers.
-33-

Additionally, the continued growth and large-scale employment of naval
aviation in support of our nucleonic, electronic and supersonic Navy
will demand the fullest expression of naval aviation knowledge and
experience in all naval administration and planning. OPNAVINST 1301.3
series sets forth policies and prescribes certain measures for the con-
tinuing closer integration of naval aviation within the Navy. These
policies, in general, affect the allocation of 1100 and 1300 billets in
the grades of commander and above.
TYPICAL CAREER ASSIGNMENT PATTERNS, CODE
1310 and 1350 OFFICERS
Typical career assignment patterns are depicted in Figures 8-6 and
8-6a for code 1310 officers, and in Figure 8-7 for code 1350 officers.
a. Code 1310 Officers - The career pattern for code 1310 officers
is based on a systematic progression of duty assignments designed to
develop in the individual officer the highest standards of professional-
ism as a naval avaitor while at the same time providing sufficient ship-
board, staff, administrative, technical and educational experience in
order to qualify the aviation officer for the various levels of naval
command.
1. First Operational Phase - Upon designation as a naval
aviator, virtually 100% of the officers are assigned to fleet operation-
al squadrons for a four year tour. This first sea tour is a critical
period of development as it is during this time that the young officer
develops his reputation as a professional highly skilled, operational
34-

naval aviator. Squadron and shipboard collateral duties provide the
young naval aviator the opportunity to acquire the essential non- fly-
ing qualifications required of all junior line officers.
Attack Carrier pilots may expect an uninterrupted tour in order
to acquire a maximum degree of experience in squadron tactics, admin-
istration, fleet deployment and shipboard operations. ASW pilots,
where possible, will be given a split tour, alternating between land and
water based multi-engined aircraft and carrier-based VS squadrons. This
will enable them not only to acquire the maximum experience in ASW
operations, but also to acquire an intimate knowledge of shipboard opera-
tions. These split tours will be confined to Regular officers and those
Reserve officers who are so motivated and recommended by their commanding
officers.
2. Professional and Technical Education Phase - Aviators
coming ashore after their initial sea duty tour should be serving in
the grade of Lieutenant. Approximately 747. of the officers rotated
ashore will be assigned to the Training Command, General Line School,
and Colleges, either as instructors or students. The remaining 267«
will be assigned to aviation activities of the Shore Establishment.
The majority of billets in the training command are operational flying
assignments thereby providing maximum opportunity for an aviator to en-
hance his professional skill.
For many officers, the first shore tour will be split. Part of the
tour will be spent in one of the school programs, i.e., postgraduate, 5-
term, or General Line School, while the remainder will be spent as an
instructor in the Training Command.
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3. Second Operational Phase - Up to 62% of the officers
going to sea for their second sea duty assignment will spend the en-
tire tour in an operational flying assignment. The remaining officers
will be given a sea tour which will be split between a flying billet
and a ship, staff, and/or overseas billet. In many cases, a third sea
tour will be commenced before the officer enters the Advanced Operation-
al and Command Development Phase (Sub para. e.). This third tour also
will be split tour for the majority of officers.
4. Advanced Educational Phase - During this tour approximate-
ly 377» of the officers will be assigned to the Training Command. The
remaining 637o will be assigned to various other air shore activities
such as the Navy Department, Naval Air Stations, etc. Certain officers
will have an opportunity to attend one of the service colleges. School-
ing and other postgraduate training will continue to be available.
Those officers who have previously attended school will be ordered to
duty allied to their postgraduate training.
5. Advanced Operational and Command Development Phase -
During this period, aviation officers receive major qualifying assign-
ments, i.e., squadron command, air group command, and ship billets.
Commencing with this period there is no schedule for sea/shore rotation,
such rotation being dependent upon the needs of the service and the
career needs of the individual for assignments of greater responsibility
leading to higher command. In addition to the command and ship tours,
there are opportunities in this area for aviation officers to increase
their professional background through attendance at services colleges
-36-

and through serving in planning and policy assignments in joint and
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PITOT AND STATIC DRAINS
LIQUID OXYGEN FILLER VALVE
Service with Liquid Oxygen
BB-O-925








Service with Lubricating Oil
Mil L7808
Access Door 81 R and 81 L
ACCUMULATOR SYSTEM NO. 2
RESERVOIR, SYSTEM NO. 2
















Service with Lubricating Oil
Mil L 6085
ASHORE MIL J.5624 JP-4, JP-5
AFLOAT MIL J.5624 JP-5
EMERGENCY MIL F.5572 AVGAS 115/145
ACCUMULATOR SYSTEM NO 1
RESERVOIR SYSTEM NO. 1
Service with Hydraulic Oil
Mil H 5606
IMPINGEMENT STARTER CONNECTION
Access Door 1 20
IF EMERGENCY FUEL IS BEING USED, THE MAIN
AND AFTERBURNER FUEL CONTROLS MUST BE









Intake duct areas clear
NOSE GEAR WELL
Tire condition, inflation
Strut extension and inflation
Shimmy damper
Gear doors secure
Brake accumulator 1500 psi
Emerg. flap bottle 2200 psi min.
Emerg. R. A. T. bottle 2200 psi min.
Emerg. M. L. G. bottle 2200 psi min.
Emerg. brake bottle 2200 psi min.
WING





Strut extension and inflation
Over center spring condition
Gear doors
Ground fueling switch - off
Speed brake safety switch - normal




Stabilator and rudder undamaged
Arresting gear guard removed
Drag chute door - secure - no streamer
LEFT WHEEL WELL
Tire condition, inflation
Strut extension and inflation
Over center spring condition
Gear doors
'l P. C. S. accumulator 1000 psi
'l P. C. S. reservoir 2000 psi
UNDERSIDE OF FUSELAGE
Access door 17 - oxygen filler cap secure
Valve in build-up position
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COCKPIT CHECK-OUT, START AND LANDING
PRE-START
1. Ejection seat - CHECK
2. Gear handle - DOWN
3. Flap handle - UP
4. Throttles - OFF
5. Generators - EXT PWR
6. Oxy - OFF
7. Emerg handles - CHECK
8. intercom - CHECK
9. Fuel panel - CHECK
10. Fuel boost - CHECK
11. Eng de-ice - NORM
12. Eng masters - OFF
13. 02 Ind - PRESS TO TEST
14. Altimeters - SET
15. Fire warning - CHECK
16. Fuel quantity gauge - CHECK
17. Missile pwr - OFF
18. Arm master - SAFE
19. Missile jett - SET
20. Emerg vent - DOWN
21. Foot heat - SET
22. Pitot & rain - OFF
23. Radio - AS DESIRED
24. Circuit breakers - IN
25. Temp cont - AS DESIRED
26. Compass cont - SLAVED
27. Warning lites - TEST
START PROCEDURE
1. Master switch - ON
2. Eng start switch R or L
3. Ignition - 1 1%
4. Throttle - Idle 11-12%
5. Eng start switch - OFF at 40%
6. Eng inst - NORMAL
7. Repeat second engine
POST START
1. Gen switches - ON
2. Signal Ext Pwr - REMOVE
3. Wings spread and locked
4. Control surfaces - CHECK
5. Damper - ON
6. Trim - NEUTRAL
7. SPC - RESET
BEFORE TAKE OFF
1. Canopy - CLOSED
2. Trim - CHECK
3. Telelite panel - CHECK
4. Check engs alternately
5. Flaps - SET
TAKE OFF
1. Release brakes - both engs to Mil
2. A/B - AS DESIRED
3. Rotate to flying attitude - 135-140
4. Gear up - safely airborne
5. Flaps up - PRIOR 225 IAS
LANDING
1. Gear DOWN below 250
2. Flaps DOWN below 215




4. Drag chute after touchdown
5. Flaps UP for taxi
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EJECTION SEAT BAIL- OUT
1. Reduce speed if possible.
2. If at low altitude, pull up into zoom.
3. Alert R. O. to eject first.
4. Pull face curtain to stop.
5. After canopy leaves, pull face curtain again to stop.
If Canopy Fails To Jettison
1. Pull emergency canopy handle aft.
If Canopy Still Has Not Jettisoned
1. Place normal canopy lever to OPEN position.
2. Pull manual canopy unlock handle.
3. Push up on canopy and the slipstream will jettison it.
4. Pull face curtain.
• • • • • WARNING • • • • •
The alternate firing handle (located between knees) causes poor
ejection posture and should only be used when it is impossible
to reach the face curtain.
• • • « • WARNING* * • •
If after bailout you are certain you are going to come down on
land - pull up on the composite release and unfasten the two
lower lap belt fittings. This will allow your seat pan to fall
free. If you are wearing a pressure suit open your face mask
before pulling up on the composite release.
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ENGINE FAILURE DURING TAKE-OFF ROLL
TAKE-OFF ABORTED
1. Both throttles to CUT-OFF
2. Call for wire.
3. Deploy drag chute.
4. Wheel brakes applied.
5. Drop hook.
6. Engine masters OFF.
TAKE-OFF CONTINUED
1. Both throttles -A/B.
2. Lift off -170 IAS.
3. Gear -UP
4. Jettison external tanks.
5. Increase airspeed.
6. Flaps UP.
7. Failed engine, CUT-OFF
8. Failed engine master, -OFF.
9. Dump wing fuel.
10. Land as soon as possible.
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ENGINE FAILURE DURING FLIGHT
1. Failed engine throttle to CUT-OFF.
If failure can be corrected attempt airstart as follows:
1. 12-16% RPM.
2. Ignition ON.
3. Advance throttle to idle detent.
4. After light-off advance to desired RPM.
2. If failure cannot be corrected:
1. Pick out closest useable airfield.
2. Engine master - OFF, failed engine.
3. Jettison external stores and wing fuel.
4. Fly wide pattern.
5. Use 1/2 wing flaps for landing.
6. Make power landing.









Rule Of Thumb: 145 IAS for 3000', increase 2 knots every additional 1000'.
DOUBLE FLAME OUT
1. Throttles to CUT-OFF.
2. Extend ram air turbine.
3. Establish 230 IAS.
4. Start either engine.
If start is not successful within 30 seconds, abort and start other engine. This
will allow the igniter to cool.
ENGINE FIRE WARNING DURING FLIGHT
1. Throttle idle on indicating engine.
2. Check for trailing smoke (in turn).
3. If smoke detected throttle OFF and engine master OFF.
4. If smoke still persists EJECT.
5. If light goes out after 1 above gradually increase RPM again. If light
comes back on shut the engine down and make a single engine landing.
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LOSS OF POWER CONTROL NO. 1 HYP. PRESSURE
1. The No. 2 power control system will supply all hydraulic requirements.
2. Reset master caution light.
3. Extend the ram air turbine (below 525 IAS).
NOTE: Hydraulically there is no time limit for ram air turbine opera-
tion. Electrically the ram air turbine will overheat after 15
minutes of operation. However, both generators must fail be-
fore the ram air turbine's electric generator assumes a load.
LOSS OF POWER CONTROL NO. 2 HYP. PRESSURE
1. The No. 1 power control system will supply all hydraulic requirements.
2. Reset master caution light.
LOSS OF UTILITY HYPRAULIC PRESSURE
1. Rudder power, auto pilot, dampers and radar antenna will be inopera-
tive.
2. MLG and flaps will have to be lowered by emergency air bottles.
3. Use manual braking (rudder pedals) during roll -out, and use emergency
braking after accumulator is depleted.
COMPLETE LOSS OF HYPRAUUCS
1. Extend ram air turbine.
2. If unable to maintain control over aircraft eject immediately.





1. Mild nose down stick force proportional to trim speed.
2. Reduced stick centering and gradient.
Action
1. Retrim as desired.
2. Avoid high speed flight.
COMPLETE BELLOWS FAILURE
Symptoms
1. Severe nose down stick force proportional to trim speed.
Action
1. Hold stick firmly to keep airplane under control.
2. Trim nose up until minimum stick force is obtained.
3. Avoid high speed flight.
4. Exercise extreme caution in fore and aft stick movements.
RUNAWAY FEEL TRIM
1. Check feel trim circuit breakers.
2. Hold stick firmly and engageauto pilot, if pitch oscillation occurs, auto-
pilot will not retrim airplane and cannot be used.
3. If auto pilot retrims system, leave auto pilot engaged until in the land-
ing pattern configuration then pull the appropriate trim circuit breaker
and disengage auto pilot.
4. If auto pi lot fails to retrim system, exercise caution during speed changes.
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WINGS WON'T TRANSFER (No External Tanks)
I. Check "Int. Wing Trans. " switch in AUTO.
I. Place "Wing Trans. Press. " switch to EMERG.
WINGS WON'T TRANSFER (With External Tanks)
1. Place "Ext Transfer" switch OFF.
2. Check 1 & 2 above.
EXTERNAL FUEL WON'T TRANSFER
1. Check "Ext. Transfer" switch in correct position.
2. Place "Wing Trans. Press. " switch to EMERG.
EXTERNAL TANKS JETTISON
To jettison outboard and center tanks.
1. Press "Ext. Stores Emerg. Release". MLG handle must be UP.
To jettison wing tanks only.
1. Lift guard on "External Tanks" switch on fuel panel and place switch to
JETT. MLG handle must be UP.
To jettison centerline tank only.
1. Place bomb control switch to "DIRECT" position and press pickle switch
on stick. MLG handle must be UP.
DITCHING
Ditching the aircraft should only be done if there is insufficient altitude for
a safe ejection.
1. Jettison canopy before water landing with emergency handle only.
2. After landing pull up on Emergency Harness Release Handle.
3. Unfasten parachute harness (upper) fittings.
4. You are now free to leave with the seat pan only.
5. Inflate life jacket when in water and pull up on the Pararaft Deployment





f either generator fails, the other generator will handle the entire electrical
oad as long as the bus tie remains closed
rVith a double failure involving a generator and the bus tie, the following
tlectrical items will be inoperative.
LEFT GENERATOR FAILURE AND BUS TIE OPEN
I. The following items will be lost.
Engine Anti-Ice
Fire Detector
A/B Ign. , both engines
Seat Adjust.
'2 Hyd Press Ind




























irVith double generator failure extend ram air turbine.













Warning Lights & Reset
Intercom
External Jettison




Generator switches - OFF.
All electrical equipment switches - OFF.
Generator switches - ON.
Turn back ON essential equipment and land as soon as possible.
If cause of fire cannot be found, extend ram air turbine, turn generators
OFF and land as soon as possible.
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WHEELS FAIL TO RETRACT
1. Check handle full UP and fully IN.
2. Check MLG circuit breaker.
3. Check utility hydraulic pressure.
WHEELS FAIL TO EXTEND
1. Check handle full DOWN.
2. Check MLG circuit breaker.
3. Check utility pressure.
4. If above does not lower gear, use emergency system as follows:
a. Reduce airspeed to less than 250 IAS.
b. Pull landing gear circuit breaker.
c. Drop gear emergency - gear handle down and pull smartly aft.
d. Check position indicators.
e. If any one gear still does not indicate down and locked, use field
arresting gear when shore based.
FLAPS FAIL TO EXTEND
1. Check flap circuit breaker.
2. Check utility hydraulic pressure.
3. Check airspeed below 215 knots.
4. Pull flap circuit breaker.
5. Lower flaps on emergency system by pulling emergency flap handle smart-
ly aft.
HOOK FAILS TO EXTEND
1. Check hook handle full down.
2. Pull arresting gear circuit breaker (rear seat).
3. If hook still not down, call ship for instructions.
HOOK FAILS TO RETRACT
1. Check hook handle full up.
2. Check arresting gear circuit breaker (rear seat).




SCHEDULE OF CAPITAL PAYMENTS FOR ROYAL
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Example 1
A typical Captain R.N., if retired at age 42 with under 6 years in the rank and
with 21 years reckonable service, will receive:
—
Retired pay £800 a year
Terminal grant £2,'
Special Capital Payment £6,<$$}*400
XJ' Example 2 . .





£650 a year /














Example 5 _ .
A typical Lieutenant {Upper Yard-man), if retired at age 33, with 12 years
reckonable service, will receive:
—






Terminal grant \ .". ... £l,065\ f/;n/;, '. . ,. •
Special Capital payment • \.. £5,000/ to,uo;>
(Normally he would receive a gratuity of £1,400.)
30258 A 4
The special capital .payments shown are those payable to officers who retire on
attaining the ages stated. For officers who retire later an adjustment will be made of
one-twelfth of any difference between this amount and the next amount for
each additional month completed.
Officers will receive retired pay and terminal grant for service rendered in accordance
with the normal rules, having regard to the nature of their previous service, with a
minimum qualifying period of 10 years service.
'
.-nple A
A typical Lt.-Commander {Special Duties List), if retired at age 47 with 20 years
reckonable service, will receive:
Retied pay „. £500 a year
Terminal grant £l,500\ f , ,9n
Special Capital payment ... £2,180 J
",08U
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